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Abstract
We construct a centralised market where agents can trade voting rights.
Text book markets do not work but the situation is strategic, and there
are many equilibria. In an equilibrium where trading takes place the min-
imun eﬃciency gain, i.e. the probability with which an eﬃcient outcome
is chosen, is between 12% and 37% depending on the number of voters.
1 Introduction
Voting is not necessarily eﬃcient. An easy way to see this is to consider the
following scenario where there are two types of people whom we call A-type and
B-type. The number of the former is a and the number of the latter is b. A-
type agents support candidate A and get utility α if he is elected. B-type agents
support candidate B and get utility β if he is elected. If an agent’s favourite
candidate is not elected he gets utility zero.
Let us assume that a > b which means that candidate A is elected in a
majority voting. If, however, aα < bβ the outcome is not eﬃcient. In voting
situations each agent is normally endowed with one vote, and one may raise the
question why there is not a market for votes. Of course, in many countries and
situations vote trading is prohibited by law but so are many other things, and
still there exist markets for them.
Before analysing the market for votes let us note that even if monetary
transfers are possible the core of this economy is empty. Whenever the votes
are distributed in such a way that candidate A is elected the grand coalition can
improve and reach the eﬃcient solution. Assume that the minimun number of
votes to tip the result of the election in favour of candidate B is k. If the votes
are distributed in such a way that candidate B is elected, and the B-type agents
acquire more than k votes (using monetary transfers) an improving coalition can
be formed by throwing one type A agent away. Finally, if the B-type agents buy
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exactly k votes some A-type agents do not sell their vote and they can oﬀer their
vote for sale at a lower price, i.e., any one of them can propose an improving
coalition. In light of this result the possibility of establishing a market looks
somewhat dismal.
Let us anyway see how one could proceed to put up a market for voting rights.
The standard Walrasian market of an economics text book is characterised by a
uniform price (for a uniform good), and in equilibrium supply equals demand.
Assume that the price for voting rights is π. It is clear that no A-type agent
wants to buy any votes since they already have suﬃcient votes to get their
favourite candidate elected. Here we have assumed that in equilibrium it is not
the case that agents of the same type may end up both as buyers and sellers.
But this is clear as can be seen below.
Assume that amongst the A-type agents some buy and some sell. Also
assume that the final outcome is that candidateA is elected. Since in equilibrium
as many votes are sold as bought, and even more strictly as many votes are
oﬀered for sale as are demanded, at least one A-type agent gets at most utility
α − π which must be positive. Now, it is not possible that any B-type agent
buys a vote because he would get utility −π. But now the A-type agent who
bought the vote of another A-type agent could improve his utility by not buying
the vote which would remain at the original owner.
So, assume that there are buyers and sellers amongst the B-type agents.
This makes sense only if the outcome is B. As before no A-type agent can be a
buyer in equilibrium. If there are to be buyers and sellers amongst the B-type
agents it must be the case that in equilibrium the B-type agents buy from A-
type agents so many votes that the votes B-type agents own exceed the votes
owned by A-type agents by one or two. Then the B-type agent who buys the
vote of another B-type agent could improve his utility by refraining. Further,
in anonymous markets all the A-type agents would like to sell their votes at a
positive price if they expect that candidate B is elected.
The above analysis proceeds along the lines of anonymous Walrasian markets
even though it is clear that vote trading involves aspects of co-ordination and
free riding. Totally anonymous markets seem not possible since the agents must
have expectations about the outcome and consequently about the number of
votes oﬀered for sale and demanded. Also, all agents would like to free ride and
let others of their type to buy the votes. One can construct equilibria where all
agents of one type oﬀer their votes for sale and a particular agent or particular
agents of the opposite type are assumed to buy the votes. But that can take
place only in specific cases. In our setting, for instance, one could number the
B-type agents from 1 to b and postulate that suﬃciently many of them, in
increasing order, buy a vote. The suﬃcient number would just tip the number
of votes in B-type’s advantage. But, of course this number is less than a and in
equilibrium supply could not equal demand.
The analysis so far strongly hints towards the fact that in constructing Wal-
rasian type markets one must take into consideration some kind of strategic
aspects, i.e. the situation is game like. Further, it looks like that there only ex-
ists a mixed stratetgy equilibrium if one wants to consider symmetric strategies
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which is in line with the anonymity assumption of Walrasian markets. This is
what we do in the next section. In section 3 we consider eﬃciency questions.
Before proceeding with the analysis we mention related literature. Surpris-
ingly, there is not much. Even though the problems of free riding and co-
ordination are well known in this setting and logrolling and implicit vote selling
has been analysed in committees (Strattman, 1992) studies about centralised
markets for voting rights are few. Closest to our article is Weiss (1988) where
voters decide on the amount of taxation that turns into a public good. The
voters diﬀer as to their preferences and endowments. His main result is that
generically the core of the vote trading game is empty. Neeman (1999) analyses
the free rider problem in general and applies his results to a vote trading situa-
tion where one large voter aims at buying the votes of small voters (magnitude
in the sense of achievable utilities). He shows that the large voter can eﬀect an
ineﬃcient outcome.
2 Centralised markets
Here the aim is to construct an institution that emulates the Walrasian markets
as closely as possible. One thing that we want to retain is anonymity, and to
this end we consider equilibria only in mixed strategies. Let us first give the
definition of equilibrium.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a price for votes π, the probability of selling
(buying) a vote m (n) for A-types and the probability of buying (selling) a vote
p (q) for B-types, such that the agents’ strategies maximise their expected utility
given their beliefs.
We assume that a > b, and that there is an odd number of agents in the
economy. Then, regardless of the number of votes that are bought either A or
B wins as there are no draws. Then the minimun number of votes needed to
tip the election in favour of candidate B is k =
£a−b
2 + 1
¤
where the brackets
signify the greatest integer function. Let us assume that the market price for
votes is π. Now we guess, and later confirm, that only B-type agents buy votes.
The probability with which they buy a single vote is p. Before proceeding we
should make clear the procedure of the centralised market. There are many
possibilities of which we focus on the following. The agents have expectations
about who will sell and who will buy votes. The organiser of the centralised
markets has an objective function that is zero if an ineﬃcient outcome results,
and unity otherwise. Thus, he announces the market price π which the agents
observe such that at least in theory it could generate trade in equilibrium. Then
the agents submit supplies and demands. In this setting there are, of course,
equilibria in which no trading takes place. For instance, if everyone expects that
no A-type agent sells his vote no B-type agent is willing to buy.
Next we construct an equilibrium in which all A-type agents oﬀer their votes
for sale and the B-type agents buy votes with probability p. To shorten the
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notation let us denote the distribution function of a binomial (b − 1, p) by F ,
so that F (i) =
Pi
j=0
¡b−1
j
¢
pj(1− p)b−1−j . To figure out the equilibrium mixed
strategy is easy; we just have to make sure that a buyer, i.e., a B-type agent, is
indiﬀerent between buying and not buying. If he buys a vote his utility is
F (k − 2)(0− π) + (1− F (k − 2)) (β − π) (1)
If he does not buy a vote his utility is
(1− F (k − 1))β (2)
Equating (1) and (2) yields the following condition that determines p
π =
µ
b− 1
k − 1
¶
pk−1(1− p)b−kβ (3)
It is immediate that when thought of as a function of p the price is maximised
at p = k−1b−1 .
For this setting to be an equilibrium we must make sure that no-one wants
to deviate. For sellers this is clear; since there are more A-type agents than
B-type agents no seller can aﬀect anything by not oﬀering his vote for sale.
The only thing that is aﬀected is that the deviating agent forfeits the chance of
receiving π. This also shows that when the agents expect k or more votes to be
oﬀered for sale then all the A-type agents want to oﬀer their votes for sale. And
B-type agents submit any bids for votes only if they expect k or more votes
to be oﬀered for sale Next we make sure that a B-type agent does not find it
profitable to become a seller. If he oﬀers his vote for sale his expected utility isPk−1
j=0
¡b−1
j
¢
pj(1− p)b−1−j ja+1π+Pb−1
j=k+1
¡b−1
j
¢
pj(1− p)b−1−j
³
j
a+1π + β
´
+µ
b− 1
k
¶
pk(1− p)b−1−k
³
k
a+1π +
a+1−k
a+1 β
´ (4)
µ
b− 1
k
¶
pk(1− p)b−1−k
µ
k
a+ 1π +
a+ 1− k
a+ 1 β
¶
A little manipulative calculation shows that (4) < (2) iﬀ and only iﬀ
b−1X
j=0
µ
b− 1
j
¶
pj(1− p)b−1−j ja+ 1π <
µ
b− 1
k
¶
pk(1− p)b−1−k ka+ 1β (5)
Inserting the equilibrium condition (3) into (5) and manipulating a little
yields the following condition
b− 2
b− 1 < p (6)
The left hand side of (6) is bigger than the value of p that maximises the
price of the vote, and for b ≥ 3 the left hand side of (6) is at least one half.
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This means that there always exists a price π such that our construction is an
equilibrium. Of course, there exist many such prices the greatest one being the
one resulting from choice p = b−2b−1 . Notice that for all prices but p =
k−1
b−1 there
are two values of p that satisfy equation (3) but condition (6) selects one of
them.
We also must make certain that a B-type agent does not want to buy 2 votes.
This is the case if π >
µ
b− 1
k − 2
¶
pk−2(1 − p)b−k+1β. Inserting the equilibrium
condition (3) here we get condition p > k−1b .
The interesting thing is the eﬃciency of this equilibrium but before that
let us study the deviation possibilities of A-type agents. It is imaginable that
an A-type agent observing price π notices that he is not certain to get this
price. But he could approach a B-type agent directly and oﬀer his vote for
sale at some price π0 < π. The B-type agent would certainly agree since he
is indiﬀerent between buying at π and not buying at all. To make sure that
this verbal reasoning is correct let us first calculate the A-type agent’s utility in
equilibrium.Pb
j=0
¡b
j
¢
pj(1− p)b−j jaπ +
Pk−1
j=0
¡b−1
j
¢
pj(1− p)b−jα =
p baπ +
Pk−1
j=0
¡b−1
j
¢
pj(1− p)b−jα
(7)
Selling his vote at price π0 to a B-type agent yields
π0 +
k−2X
j=0
µ
b− 1
j
¶
pj(1− p)b−1−jα (8)
Now (7) is greater than (8) if and only if
π
µ
p ba + (1− p)
α
β
¶
> π0 (9)
The coeﬃcient of π in (9) is less than unity, and consequently the exist π0
that are greater than the left hand side of (9) and less than π. So, only the
lowest possible equilibrium price π = 0 is immune against this kind of deviation
but then p = 1. For a centralised market to function at all it must be the case
that this kind of deviation is not feasible. This may be the case if vote trading is
prohibited outside the market place or people do not know each others’ identity.
3 Eﬃciency
On the basis of the above analysis the key to establishing functioning markets
for votes in this setting is not to allow private exchange. Next we study what
is the minimum eﬃciency gain in an equilibrium in which trading takes place.
This is achieved when the price of a vote is at its maximum which is π = b−2b−1 .
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Of course, the probability of buying a vote is at its minimum consistent with
(6).
We only consider cases where the B-type agents are so numerous that in
equilibrium they buy at most one vote. This means that at maximum k =£a−b
2 + 1
¤
can equal b. This is equivalent to a = 3b − 1. In this case B-type
agents have to buy B votes, i.e. one vote each in order to get their favourite
elected. This happens with probability
pb =
µ
b− 2
b− 1
¶b
=
µ
1− 1b− 1
¶b
(10)
The magnitude in (10) increases towards e−1 ≈ 0.367 when b grows without
limit. Already when b = 3 (10) equals 0.125. This way we get an idea about the
minimum eﬃciency that one can expect in this kind of voting right markets in
an equilibrium where the agents trade. In a very large society the probability
that the eﬃcient outcome, i.e. B, comes about is more than 35%. This may
not be a particularly impressive figure. In particular, if one takes into account
that there are necessarily other equilibria where no trade takes place, and the
ineﬃcient outcome is certain.
4 Conclusion
We have strived at constructing a centralised market for voting rights. One may
think of this as a futile enterprise, but we think that the features that are often
mentioned as reasons for the lack of such markets are nicely illuminated here.
Free riding and co-ordination problems preclude text book centralised market,
and the best we can get is a market where the agents’ behaviour is strategic
and where multiple equilibria exist. On top of that, it is necessary to prevent
private vote trading; all trading must take place via the centralised markets.
The probability of the eﬃcient outcome is at the minimum between 12%
and 37% depending on the number of the agents. This kind of eﬃciency gain
would probably be thought of remarkable in other sectors of the economy. If
one believes in the co-ordinating ability of the government these gains could
also be achievable without immense problems, as the government could choose
the equilibrium where trading takes place.
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